Séminaires de recherche

State Capacity and the Enforcement of Property Rights in the Natural Resource Sector

Mardi | 2012-12-18
B103

Louis HOTTE

We analyse the general-equilibrium consequences of property right enforcement in the natural resource sector when exclusion is costly to achieve. The key assumption is that exclusion requires both private and public enforcement efforts to supplement each other. Our main question consists in comparing states that differ by their ability to provide protection services. This ability is exogenous and referred to as state capacity. We first show that in a decentralized equilibrium with de jure property rights, private enforcement decisions are excessive from an efficiency standpoint. In the process, we offer propositions regarding the nature of the interaction between public and private enforcement activities. We obtain that public enforcement services have a non-monotonous effect on national income when state capacity is sufficiently high. For low-capacity states, however, property enforcement invariably leads to a drop in national income even though it may cause the resource to be better managed.

Un réexamen de la non-linéarité entre le développement financier et la croissance économique

Mardi | 2012-12-04
B103

Comlanvi Jude EGGOH – Patrick VILLIEU

Cet article présente un modèle simple de croissance endogène dans lequel le secteur financier améliore l’efficacité de la transformation de l’épargne en investissement. Le modèle fait apparaître l’existence de trajectoires multiples de croissance endogène à long terme, et la possibilité d’une relation non linéaire entre le développement financier et la croissance, le niveau de développement financier exerçant un effet de seuil dans cette relation. Les tests empiriques réalisés selon la méthode PSTR (Panel Smooth Threshold Regression) sur un panel de 71 pays sur la période 1960-2006 confirment cet effet de seuil : la relation entre développement financier et croissance est positive lorsque le développement financier est relativement faible, mais son signe devient difficile à déterminer dans les pays financièrement développés. Cet effet de seuil est corroboré lorsque l’endogénéité du développement financier est prise en compte à l’aide de la méthode des moments généralisés (GMM) sur panel dynamique.

Democracy and Financial development: Does the Institutional Quality Matter (Version préliminaire)

Mercredi | 2012-11-23
Sully 10

Abdelkader BOUDRIGA – Wafa GHARDALLOU- BEN AHMED

This paper examines whether the effects of democracy on financial development are influenced by the quality of institutions using a panel dataset of a large sample of developed and developing countries over the period 1984-2006. The results indicate that democracy plays a direct important role in stimulating the financial development. Particularly, effects of democracy on financial development are enhanced by higher levels of economic institutions. Otherwise, development may be hampered if these institutions are below some threshold values. Furthermore, results indicate that parliamentary forms of government as well as a greater political polarization increase the effects of democracy on financial development. On the other hand, we found that to take full benefits from democracy, democratizing counties should promote economic institutions, encourage the independence of the bureaucracy from political power and divide the power between the central government and the political units. Eventually, results show that when democracy is not yet established, democratizing countries ought to opt for a presidential form of government since it represents a direct channel that promotes the development of the financial sector.

Debt Renegotiation

Mardi | 2012-10-23
B103

Franck MORAUX – Florina SILAGHI – Sébastien GALANTI

This paper develops a new model of debt renegotiation in a structural framework that accounts for both taxes and bankruptcy costs. Renegotiation consists of a permanent coupon reduction that occurs at an endogenous renegotiation threshold and that does not decrease the debt value, ensuring creditors to be at worse indifferent. We investigate the size of the optimal coupon reduction and show that the new coupon has to lie in a certain range due to Pareto efficiency and participation constraints. The exact size of the new coupon and the sharing of the renegotiation surplus depend on the bargaining power of claimants. The optimal number of renegotiations is also analyzed. As the renegotiation surplus is rapidly decreasing in the number of renegotiations, and renegotiation costs increase with the number of renegotiations, a firm can only have a limited very small number of renegotiations, which is in line with empirical evidence.

The Political Economy of FDI Flows into Developing Countries: Does the Depth of International Trade Agreements Matter? (version préliminaire)

Mercredi | 2012-07-04
B103

Arslan Tariq RANA

There is considerable debate whether the domestic political institutions specifically, the country’s level of democracy) of the host developing country toward foreign investors are effective in establishing the credibility of commitments are still underway, researchers have also analyzed the effect of international institutions such as (GATT/WTO) membership and Bilateral Investment treaties (BITs) in their role of establishing the credibility of commitment to attract foreign investments. In addition, most recent studies have examined the effect of International Trade Agreements (TAs) on FDI flows as they contain separate investment chapters and dispute settlement mechanism, thus providing confidence to investor regarding the security of their investments. I argue that there are qualitative differences among various types of trade agreements and full-fledged trade agreements (FTA/CUs) provide credibility to foreign investors and democracy level in the host country conditions this effect whereas the partial scope agreements (PSAs) are not sufficient in providing credibility of commitments and not moderated by democracy. This paper analyses the impact of heterogeneous TAs, and their interaction with domestic institutions, on FDI inflows. Statistical analyses for 122 developing countries from 1970 to 2005 support this argument. The method adopted relies on fixed effects estimator which is robust to control endogeneity on a large panel dataset. The strict erogeneity of results by using a method suggested by Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and no feedback effect found in sample. The results state that (1) More the FTAs/CUs concluded, larger the amount of FDI inflows are attracted into the developing countries and PSAs are insignificant in determining the FDI inflow; (2) FTAs/CUs are complementary to democratic regime whereas the conditional effect of PSAs with democracy on levels of FDI inflows is insignificant.

Stock Market Reaction to Layoff Annoucements: European Evidence (2002-2010)

Mardi | 2012-07-03
B103

Delia CORNEA-TATU – Gunther CAPELLE-BLANCARD

The stock market reaction to layoff announcements depends on investors’ perception regarding the information contained in these announcements. In this paper, we examine this reaction using a new sample of restructuring announcements occurred in different European countries, over the period 2002-2010. The results reveal an overall negative, but not significant, market reaction of –0.177% for a three days event window. However, extending the analysis to specific layoff characteristics and to other variables characterizing sectorial and macroeconomic environment of restructuring countries we find that the stock market reaction is significantly correlated with the reasons stated into announcement, the frequency of layoffs occurrence and macroeconomic context. Moreover, some specific labor market indicators, like employment protection legislation, labor cost and unemployment reveal a significant impact on stock price reaction.

Bank lending Channel in MENA Countries: Evidence from Dynamic Panel Model

Mercredi | 2012-06-26
B103

Samouel Beji – Aram BELHADJ

Most of the works related to monetary policy transmission mechanisms did not take into account the special case of developing countries. In these countries, given their features (exchange rate rigidity, financial fragility, banking prominence, etc.), it seems that the most reliable monetary transmission mechanism is the lending channel. The purpose of this paper is to focus specifically on this channel in 18 MENA Countries by using a GMM system on dynamic panel aggregated data from 1990 to 2009. We regress credit volume on the instrument of monetary policy. Meanwhile, we add many control variables to resolve the supply-demand puzzle. Thereafter, we include variables describing the sensitiveness of the lending behavior to the institutional environment quality as well as to key bank characteristics. Our results suggest that the lending channel is operational in MENA Countries. Moreover, lending activity could be positively affected by an efficient institutional framework as well as the size and liquidity of the banking sector, while, on the contrary, it could be negatively affected by banking concentration.