Béatrice BOULU-RESHEF

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Cet article propose une approche expérimentale de l’efficacité des dispositifs de lutte contre les cartels, lesquels résultent de décisions individuelles de s’engager dans ces pratiques d’ententes anticoncurrentielles. Nos expériences comparent les propensions individuelles à former des cartels dans les dispositifs de sanctions monétaires, de clémence, de conformité et d’exclusion. Notre étude évalue ainsi l’impact des modalités de sanctions, de leurs niveaux et de différentes probabilités de détection, et identifie l’influence de certaines caractéristiques individuelles, telles que le genre et l’aversion au risque, sur la formation des cartels. Nos résultats montrent que le dispositif d’exclusion, et dans une moindre mesure de conformité, sont les plus efficaces pour dissuader la formation de cartels. Le niveau et les probabilités de sanction ont les effets escomptés mais de manières non linéaires. La clémence renforce quant à elle l’efficacité des amendes. Enfin, le genre et l’aversion au risque influencent la propension à choisir de s’engager dans un cartel, mais pas leur taux de formation. Les implications de ces résultats pour le régulateur et les entreprises sont substantielles : ils permettent de comprendre comment mieux dissuader ces pratiques illicites.

We study a finitely repeated public goods game (based on the voluntary contribution mechanism) played under complete uncertainty about the marginal benefit of the public good relative to the private consumption (commonly known as the marginal per capita return): neither one's marginal per capita return nor other players' marginal per capita returns are known at the time of decisionmaking. We show that contributions are equivalent when the rate of return is predetermined and when it is uncertain, and display a similar decay over time. Combined with the previous experimental findings, our results suggest that the cooperation in public goods games is sensitive to the source of uncertainty about marginal per capita return.

Comment on Maestripieri, Henry, Nickels: Explaining financial and prosocial biases in favor of attractive people: Interdisciplinary perspectives from economics, social psychology, and evolutionary psychology”, forthcoming in Behavioral and Brain Sciences.

To make better decisions today, companies and other economic agents are interested in getting accurate predictions of future events. Prediction markets can, at least potentially, give those accurate forecasts for the probability of the event by aggregating information from traders. However, formal studies highlight that the risk attitudes of market participants may bias the market equilibrium prices, and consequently make the prediction unreliable. This research examines the effect of participants' risk attitudes on prediction market prices, through a framed field experiment on the two semifinals at the 2015 NCAA Men's Division Basketball Tournament. The results of the experiment show a significant price difference between the risk-averse group and the less risk-averse group. The large price discrepancy between markets with participants with varying risk aversion suggests that risk aversion deserves a critical consideration in future prediction-market research and implementation.

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Prediction- and control-based strategies are the two main hypotheses of how entrepreneurs deal with uncertainty in theories of entrepreneurship. Prediction-based strategies focus on estimating unknowns via sampling methods, whereas control-based strategies focus on shaping unknowns via proactive behavior. These strategies may lead to different propensities to undertake uncertain prospects, as they differ in terms of cognition and involvement. In an experimental test, we study the conditions under which prediction- and control-based strategies lead subjects to accept bets in ambiguous environments. Individuals who use control methods to mitigate uncertainty are more likely to accept the bet after a favorable outcome compared to those who use predictive methods. These results revert in the presence of unfavorable outcomes. We discuss the implications for entrepreneurship theory and practice.

Despite the boom in research on identity in economics, the question of how to depict personal identity in a fashion that combines potentially conflicting social identities has so far been largely ignored. This paper introduces a framework that relies on the structure of the social realm that is exogenous to the individual in order to depict investment decisions as per social identities. The structure of the environment is identified using organizational boundaries and identity production functions are used to combine social identities. The inclusion of the various social spaces that are relevant to personal identity strategies enables one to simultaneously study identification strategies and individuation strategies. It also allows the depiction of social identities that may be conflicting, due to different social commitments and/or norm valuations. This externalist conception of identity helps discuss the limitations of internalist conceptions of identity and accounts for the heterogeneity of identity strategies across individuals.

This paper discusses the interaction between revenue management and customer relationship management for a firm that operates in a customer retention situation but faces limited capacity. We present a dynamic programming model for how the firm balances investments in customer acquisition and retention, as well as retention across multiple customer types. We characterize the optimal policy and discuss how the policy changes depending on capacity limitations. We then contrast the modeling results with those of a behavioral experiment in which subjects acted as managers making acquisition and retention decisions. In the modeling part of the paper, we introduce a concept of the value of an incremental customer (VIC), and show that when capacity is unlimited, VIC equals customer lifetime value (CLV), but when capacity is limited, VIC is much smaller and changes dynamically depending on the number of customers and their mix. As a result, the optimal spending is constant and depends on CLV for the firms with unlimited capacity, but changes dynamically and is generally unrelated to CLV when capacity is limited. In the experimental part, we introduce a concept of conditional optimality for the analysis of state-dependent decisions. Applying this concept to our data, we document a number of decision biases, specifically the subjects' tendency to overspend on retaining high-value customers and underspend on lower-value customers retention and acquisition. We show that providing CLV information exacerbates these biases and leads to a loss of net revenue when capacity is limited, but providing information about the marginal costs of acquisition and retention eliminated these biases and increases net revenue.

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Voluntary contributions are often solicited in sequential and public settings where information on the quality of the fundraising project unfolds with the sequence of decisions. This paper examines how the different sources of information available to potential donors in such settings influence their decision-making. Contrary to most of the leadership literature, neither leaders nor followers in these settings have certainty about the quality of the fundraising project. We explore whether leaders remain influential, the extent to which they use their influence strategically, and the consequences on followers when leaders are misinformed. We combine an information cascade method with a modified public goods game to create a “Voluntary Contributions in Cascades” paradigm. Participants sequentially receive private signals about the state of the world, which determines the potential returns from the public good, and take two public actions: an incentivized prediction about the state of the world and a contribution to the public good. We find that participants' predictions mostly align with Bayesian predictions, and find no evidence for strategic or misleading predictions. Leaders' contributions are positively correlated with followers', suggesting they remain influential despite their limited informational advantage. This influence takes a tragic turn when leaders happen to be misinformed, as most misinformed leaders end up unintentionally misleading followers. We find that having a misleading leader is associated with a reduction in gains from contributions roughly twice as large as the reduction that stems from dividing the marginal-per-capita-return by two. Our results stress the significance of having well-informed leaders.

Parochial altruism-individual sacrifice to benefit the in-group and harm an out-group-undermines inter-group cooperation and is implicated in a plethora of politically-significant behaviors. We report new experimental findings about the impact of variation in social distance within the in-group together with variation in social distance between the in-and out-groups on parochial altruism. Building from a minimal group paradigm setup , we find that differential social distance has a systematic effect on individual choice in a setting of potential inter-group conflict. In particular, parochial altruism is stimulated when individuals' distance to both their in-and out-group is high. A long-standing finding about behavior in contexts of inter-group conflict is that low social distance facilitates collective action. Our results suggest that the effects of high social distance may create a potential additional pathway to group-based individual action. Research on inter-group conflict and collective action can be advanced by investigating such effects.

Cet article propose une approche expérimentale qui rend possible l'identification des individus les plus susceptibles de former un cartel : les « têtes brûlées ». Les expériences testent l'efficacité dissuasive des différents dispositifs de lutte contre les cartels en comparant les propensions à s'entendre des individus dans différents types de dispositifs de sanctions-amende, clémence, conformité, et exclusion-et de détection-détection avec probabilité exogène ou par dénonciation dans le cas de la clémence. La conformité et l'exclusion s'avèrent particulièrement dissuasive, la clémence ne l'est pas. L'effet dissuasif des amendes élevées est limité pour les « têtes brûlées », qui sont davantage influencés par l'ampleur du risque de détection. Les différences de genre et d'aversion pour le risque impactent le comportement chez les autres participants mais pas chez les individus qualifiés de « têtes brûlées ».

We study a finitely repeated public goods game (based on the voluntary contribution mechanism) played under complete uncertainty about the marginal benefit of the public good relative to the private consumption (commonly known as the marginal per capita return): neither one's marginal per capita return nor other players' marginal per capita returns are known at the time of decision-making. We show that contributions are equivalent when the rate of return is predetermined and when it is uncertain, and display a similar decay over time. Combined with the previous experimental findings, our results suggest that the cooperation in public goods games is sensitive to the source of uncertainty about marginal per capita return.

Organizations often match leaders with followers in order to foster cooperation, mitigate free riding, and thereby accomplish tasks effectively. This paper studies the effect of organization styles on leaders' choices of leadership strategy, and the effect of this choice on free-riding behavior. In controlled experiments, leaders are asked to choose messages from a message set that induces a leadership style and to send it to followers in a repeated and finite horizon public goods game. When provided with collegial leadership style messages, leaders perform better than their top down counterparts, but only when targeted private communication is not allowed. When it is allowed, leaders who are instructed to be top down perform better by focusing on individuals, not the group, and by leading while accounting for contributor types. The paper uncovers core and understudied mechanisms of top down leadership, and challenges the consensus that collegiality is best for leading groups.

This paper studies the effect of firm boundaries on inter-individual cooperation in corporate settings. I conduct a framed-field linear public good game experiment in the natural environment of the workplace. I use information about the actual boundaries of two firms, which are a parent firm and its subsidiary. I document differences in the overall level of cooperation across the parent firm, its subsidiary, and an intra-corporate group that comprises players from both the parent firm and the subsidiary. In stark contrast to previous results, I find that cooperation is increasing over time within the parent firm, indicating that firms can foster stronger cooperation within their boundaries. In other treatments the standard declining cooperation is not rejected. Overall, I find higher levels of contribution to the public good relative to conventional laboratory experiments. I estimate the importance of individuals' identity and find that higher weight placed on identity is associated with higher contributions, but only within the parent firm. Higher levels of self-awareness can help explain patterns of cooperation within the boundaries of the firm.