Date : Jeudi | 2025-06-19 à 12h30
Lieu : Salle des thèses

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Bianca Tanasa (DEAMS/University of Trieste)

In many countries, a private health system coexists with the public one. Recently, however, it seems that the latter is subjected to budgetary cuts and no longer able to meet the needs of citizens. Within an OLG model in which young people invest in preventive medicine, we assume that the public health system is rationed by increasing waiting times, which entails a cost in terms of treatment effectiveness and psychological order. Considering a fiscal policy aimed at providing health services, stabilizing the debt-to-GDP ratio and taxing the income of the working population, we demonstrate that there emerge two stationary solutions. The highest steady state turns out to be globally stable, while the lower one globally unstable. In addition, investment in preventive medicine and spending on private health are pro-cyclical, while waiting times are counter-cyclical. We also study the set of optimal allocations chosen by a benevolent social planner and prove that investment in preventive medicine as well as total spending on health are pro-cyclical and their long run values are increasing in the social discount factor. Finally, we decentralize the set of optimal allocations by fixing opportunely the debt-to-GDP ratio and Government spending.